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PANEL ASSIGNMENT IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
Marin K. Levy†
It is common knowledge that the federal courts of appeals
typically hear cases in panels of three judges and that the
composition of the panel can have significant consequences for
case outcomes and for legal doctrine more generally. Yet
neither legal scholars nor social scientists have focused on the
question of how judges are selected for their panels. Instead,
a substantial body of scholarship simply assumes that panel
assignment is random.
This Article provides what, up until this point, has been a
missing account of panel assignment. Drawing on a multiyear
qualitative study of five circuit courts, including in-depth interviews with thirty-five judges and senior administrators, I
show that strictly random selection is a myth, and an improbable one at that—in many instances, it would have been impossible as a practical matter for the courts studied here to
create their panels by random draw. Although the courts generally tried to “mix up” the judges, the chief judges and clerks
responsible for setting the calendar also took into account various other factors, from collegiality to efficiency-based considerations. Notably, those factors differed from one court to the
next; no two courts approached the challenge of panel assignment in precisely the same way.
These findings pose an important challenge to the widespread assumption of panel randomness and reveal key normative questions that have been largely ignored in the
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literature. Although randomness is regarded as the default
selection method across much of judicial administration, there
is little exposition of why it is valuable. What, exactly, is
desirable about having judges brought together randomly in
the first place? What, if anything, is problematic about nonrandom methods of selection? This Article sets out to clarify
both the costs and benefits of randomness, arguing that there
can be valid reasons to depart from it. As such, it provides a
framework for assessing different panel assignment practices
and the myriad other court practices that rely, to some extent,
on randomness.
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INTRODUCTION
It is common knowledge that the federal courts of appeals
typically decide cases in panels of three judges.1 What is not
commonly known is how the judges are assigned to panels.
Rather, it has long been assumed that the panels are randomly
1
See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical
Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1897 (2009) (“Because we typically sit and hear cases in
panels of three, appellate judges do not act alone in deciding cases . . . .”); Pauline
T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1324 (2009)
(“Clearly, then, the fact that federal appellate judges hear cases in panels of three
makes a difference in their decision making.”); Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on
Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2396 (2014) (noting that appellate judges “hear cases
in panels of three”).
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formed.2 That assumption has been foundational to a significant body of empirical scholarship about the federal courts.3
But there is reason to doubt that appellate panels are, or
could be, “strictly random.” For courts that hear arguments
throughout the year,4 it would be practically impossible to
place the names of each judge into a hat and simply draw three
for each sitting. A given judge might fall ill; another might be
scheduled to judge a moot court out of state; yet another might
have a meeting of one of the committees of the United States
Judicial Conference. That is, there are likely some factors that
courts take into account when configuring panels to hear
cases—a point supported by a recent quantitative study that I
coauthored.5
If courts are not configuring their panels in a strictly random fashion, how are they creating them? Given the importance of the decision makers on any given panel, it is surprising
that no scholarship has taken up this question before. This
void is particularly striking in light of how many articles have
noted that panels are randomly formed.6 And it is more striking still given the significant number of articles that rely on the
2
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 953, 1009–10 (2005) (“In the Courts of Appeals, panels are the product of
random draws of three among a larger set of members of the court.”); Lee Epstein,
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 110 (2011) (“We
assume that members of a panel are chosen randomly from the judges of the
court, which is the practice in all circuits.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles,
Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 2193, 2197 (2009) (noting that
within the federal courts of appeals, “judges are randomly assigned to three-judge
panels”); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216 (1999) (“[T]he random assignment of
federal appellate judges to panels has become a ‘hallmark’ of the system.”).
3
See generally, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin,
Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010);
Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (2008); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493 (2008); Jonathan P.
Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 167 (2012); Sunstein & Miles, supra note 2; Cass R. Sunstein, David
Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals:
A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004).
4
Courts that hold what I call “rolling sittings” throughout the year stand in
contrast to courts that have designated court weeks. For the latter category of
courts, it is easier to approximate randomly configured panels. See infra subpart
IV.A.
5
See generally Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2015) (providing empirical evidence of nonrandom panel assignment in several
federal appellate courts).
6
See supra note 2.
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so-called randomness assumption when building models about
the judiciary to address critical questions of judicial decision
making.7 In short, it is vital—both for our understanding of a
key aspect of judicial administration and for our ability to
study judges—to know how judicial assignment is made.
This Article takes up the task of exploring how argument
panels are formed in the federal courts of appeals. As there is
little publicly-available information on the topic,8 doing so requires gathering data directly from the courts themselves. Specifically, this Article rests on a multi-year9 qualitative project
involving interviews with thirty-five judges and senior administrators of the D.C., First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits.10
The data reveal that none of the courts configure their panels in
a strictly random fashion, and that it would have been practically impossible for most to do so (although it should be noted
that one Circuit, the Fourth, came closest to strictly random
assignment).11 The data further tell an important story about
the challenges of judicial administration, the balancing of different values within our judiciary, and the variation—in values
and practices—across the different circuit courts.
At the outset it is important to note that the absence of
randomness does not mean the presence of any sort of ideological maneuvering. To be clear, there is no suggestion from this
study that the relevant decision maker of the circuit—be it a
chief judge or clerk of court or circuit executive—at any time
attempted to set the calendar with an intent to affect, say, the
number of majority liberal or conservative panels. The factors
considered by the courts ranged from those related to logistics
to those touching on collegiality, but none had an ideological
bent.
To begin, as one might expect, most courts created their
argument panels with some consideration for logistical or efficiency-based factors. For example, several courts took into
account the personal schedules of the judges. The calendar
preferences of senior judges were given particular weight—a
senior judge’s request to sit during a given week in a given
month might be accommodated—to encourage those judges to
7

See supra note 3.
For a detailed description of the publicly-available information on panel
assignment, see infra subpart I.B.
9
The majority of the interviews took place between 2012 and 2013, but
follow-up interviews continued through 2015.
10
For a description of how I selected the circuits and the methodology of the
project more generally, see infra subpart II.A.
11
See infra subpart II.B.
8
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provide as many days of service as possible.12 Still within the
vein of efficiency, some courts formed particular panels for the
purpose of hearing a case on remand—three judges that originally heard a matter would be deliberately brought back together to hear the case in its later iteration.13
Less expected, however, are the other factors that, on the
judges’ own accounts, do not touch on the efficient administration of justice. For example, one circuit had a long-standing
tradition of ensuring that a judge within her first year have the
experience of presiding; since the presiding judge must be the
active judge with the most years on the court (apart from the
chief judge),14 this experience was ensured by arranging a
panel with, for instance, a senior judge and a visiting judge.15
Some circuits held special sessions of court at law schools
located within the circuit and then drew the panel from the
pool of judges in that geographic region.16 As another example,
though the practice had fallen out of favor by the time of the
study, two circuits previously had allowed judges to identify
other judges with whom they did not care to sit, and the preference was considered when forming the court’s panels.17
These findings matter in several key respects. They are
important for our own understanding of the federal courts and
for scholarship about those courts—particularly empirical
scholarship that rests on the assumption that panels are randomly configured. Furthermore, these findings are relevant for
the courts themselves. What may be the most striking finding
from this study is the extent to which the judges stated that
they did not know how the panels were formed in their own
courts, or said that they thought the panels were formed ran12
Senior judges elect how much to sit—they can choose to hear a caseload
that is 25% of that of an active judge or, say, 75%. The more days that a senior
judge chooses to hear cases, the fewer cases need then be distributed amongst the
rest of the court. See Levy, supra note 1, at 2417 n.153 (noting that the ability of
senior judges to set their workload seems to be a matter of custom and not
explicitly authorized by statute); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior
Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453, 461 (2007) (stating that
“[e]lecting senior status allows a judge to take on a reduced workload” if he or she
desires, “as little as one-quarter of the work of an active judge, while still receiving
the salary of the office”). For further discussion of the sitting decisions of senior
judges, see generally Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the
Political Economy of Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495 (2005).
13
See infra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
14
See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). If the chief judge of the court is a member of
the panel, then he or she automatically is the presiding judge. Id. at § 45(b)
15
See infra notes 114–24 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 135–40 and accompanying text.
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domly—say, by a computer program—when this ultimately
turned out to not be the case.18 Indeed, outside of the clerk’s
office and the chambers of the chief judge or former chief
judges, there was little knowledge about the way that the argument panels were formed—much less how they might be
formed in other circuits. Accordingly, these findings fill a gap
in our collective knowledge of the federal courts.
That knowledge, in turn, leads to normative questions.
How should we assess the varying panel assignment practices?
Are there at least some factors that should not be taken into
account when deciding which judges will sit together? As with
many other issues of judicial administration, trade-offs are inevitable. Taking into account the particular scheduling preferences of senior judges, say, involves moving further away from
a random configuration of panels but comes with a gain in
judicial resources. Balancing these factors then requires a
thicker account of the values of randomness in the first place.
This Article provides such an account and, drawing upon
theories of randomness from other adjudicatory contexts, argues that randomness in panel configuration is not valuable in
and of itself. Rather, as in other settings such as the assignment of cases to judges, randomness is favored because it ensures that the assignment process will not be manipulated to
increase the chance of selecting judges likely to hold a particular point of view (and, perhaps just as importantly, that there
will be no appearance of such manipulation). Keeping these
values in mind, the Article sketches a framework for assessing
different panel assignment practices. Some practices, such as
taking into account certain logistical considerations, will provide important gains in efficiency without implicating concerns
of predetermining or biasing case outcomes (or the appearance
of doing so) and accordingly are perfectly appropriate. Other
practices, such as selecting particular judges for special sittings, warrant greater consideration.
The final Part turns from individual practices to the system
as a whole. Specifically, the findings reveal that no two circuits
configure their panels in precisely the same way, prompting
one to ask how such variation across the federal courts should
be regarded. Drawing upon previous research in judicial administration,19 the Article argues that perfect uniformity in
panel assignment procedures will be practically impossible for
the circuits to achieve. There are simply too many variations in
18
19

See infra notes 154–59 and accompanying text.
See infra subpart IV.A.
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circuit organization—from how often they hold argument to
how many judges they have—that affect how the panels are
formed. Furthermore, it is precisely these differences that impact the consideration of any individual practice in the different courts, necessarily creating variation. And yet,
determining that there will be disuniformity in panel assignment does not mean that there is no space for improvement.
The Article concludes by calling for greater transparency to
encourage the necessary deliberation about assignment procedures and to improve the internal workings of the appellate
courts.
I
BACKGROUND ON PANEL ASSIGNMENT
District judges tend to hear cases by themselves.20 The
Supreme Court Justices almost always hear cases as a full
court of nine.21 The court of appeals judges can be located,
appropriately, in between—when not sitting en banc, they tend
to hear cases in panels of three.22 One consequence of this
structure is that, unlike their lower and higher court counterparts, the circuit courts require a process for selecting which
judges will sit together.23 That is, even before cases are assigned to panels, the circuit courts need to determine which

20
It is important to note that district judges tend to decide cases alone, as
there are some instances in which they hear cases in panels. For example, redistricting cases are heard by panels of three federal district judges—as required by
statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012).
21
It is worth noting that the Court almost always hears cases as a full complement of Justices, as there are times when one or more justices will recuse
themselves, per 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (“Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.”); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090,
2111 (2016) (“Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.”); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1931 (2015)
(“Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.”).
22
See supra note 1.
23
This is true for all of the regional circuit courts when configuring argument
panels, and true of the Ninth Circuit as well when configuring en banc panels.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit holds a “limited” en banc with only a subset of its
court members. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (stating that an en banc court shall consist
of the chief judge and ten additional judges); see also 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2012)
(providing that en banc courts shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active
service unless section 6 of Pub. L. No. 95–486, 92 Stat. 1633 provides otherwise);
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (creating an
exception for courts with more than fifteen judges).
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judges will make up the dozens (and sometimes hundreds) of
panels24 that will hear arguments in the coming term.25
For decades, legal scholars have assumed that the process
by which judges are assigned to panels is a random one. Indeed, scores of law review articles have included this claim.
Within this body of scholarship, a substantial number of empirical studies on judicial decision making have rested on this
assumption to reach their results. It is only recently that a
quantitative study that I coauthored with Adam Chilton, in
examining data on oral argument panels in all twelve regional
circuit courts, found evidence that at least some of the courts
did not create panels randomly.26
That scholars have made assumptions about panel formation is perhaps a by-product of the fact that there is little publicly-available information on the subject. Specifically, there
are very few statutory requirements regarding panel formation,
and there is limited information from the courts themselves in
local rules and operating procedures on how panels are
formed.
This Part briefly discusses the long-standing assumption
of random panel formation in the scholarly literature. It then
turns to the rules of randomness—what statutory requirements exist regarding panel configuration and what practices
courts note that they follow in their local rules and procedures.
A. Assumptions of Randomness
Numerous academic articles have stated that oral argument panels in the federal appellate courts are randomly
formed.27 This claim is present in scholarship on a variety of
24

See Chilton & Levy, supra note 5, at 25.
The phrase “term” is something of a construct. Although some circuits,
such as the D.C. Circuit, have formal terms, others do not. I use this phrase to
refer to the year of sittings that takes place between September 1 and August 31 of
the following year.
26
See Chilton & Levy, supra note 5, at 37–45.
27
See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 2, at 1009–10; Epstein,
Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 110; Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement, and Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 55, 66–67 (noting criticism
of “the current practice of randomly assigning judges to appellate panels”); Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary: On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1073
(2014) (“Random assignment of judges to panels means that subgroups of the
entire court are constituted to hear and decide particular cases.”); Jud Mathews,
Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1373 (2013) (noting that for the article’s
model about how courts apply deference standards in different agency cases, “it is
enough that the assignment of judges to panels be random” (emphasis omitted));
Sunstein & Miles, supra note 2, at 2197; Tiller & Cross, supra note 2, at 216.
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topics—from federal courts to constitutional law to administrative law28—and has remained the dominant view of panel assignment. As Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross put it, random
assignment of judges to panels has become viewed as a “hallmark” of the federal system.29
The claim that panel assignment is random has been made
not only by scholars but also by judges. Specifically, Judge
Richard Posner has written that “the panels that hear cases are
randomly selected from the court’s judges.”30 Similarly, Judge
Robert Parker of the Fifth Circuit stated that in his court, “[t]he
panels are selected at random.”31 And Judge Alex Kozinski,
former Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, likewise suggested that
panels were drawn randomly—a result of “the luck of the
draw.”32
To be sure, it is quite possible that not all of these authors
meant to suggest that panels are formed in a strictly random
fashion—that is, by placing the names of each judge into a hat
and selecting three for each sitting. The authors might well
have meant something less rigid than this standard. For example, they might well have considered panel assignment to still
be random even if it took into account a given judge’s trip to
judge moot court on a particular date or another judge’s vacation during a particular week, and so forth—what one might
call “practical randomness.” Even acknowledging the potential
for ambiguity, what is clear is that these various articles assumed that panels were formed without a deliberate intent
and, if not in a strictly random manner, at least without the
deliberate consideration of factors beyond, say, basic logistical
matters.
This assumption has played a particularly relevant role in
empirical research. A robust quantitative literature on judicial
decision making at the court of appeals has justified its research design and identification strategy for making causal
28

See supra note 27.
See Tiller & Cross, supra note 2, at 216 (first citing Joseph W. Bellacosa,
Judging Cases v. Courting Public Opinion, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2381, 2390 (1997);
and then citing Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the
Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 630 (1994)).
30
Richard A. Posner, A Heartfelt, Albeit Largely Statistical, Salute to Judge
Richard D. Cudahy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 357 (2012).
31
Robert M. Parker, Foreword, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 265, 266 (1995).
32
Alex Kozinski & James Burnham, I Say Dissental, You Say Concurral, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 601, 607 (2012) (arguing that the practice of dissenting from, or
concurring in, orders denying rehearings en banc can be beneficial to a judge who
was not a member of the original three-judge panel simply because of “the luck of
the draw”).
29
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inferences on the randomness of panel assignment.33 After
assuming that judges are randomly assigned to panels (and
that cases are then randomly assigned to those panels), the
studies in this literature have gone on to test such hypotheses
as whether judges vote differently when their panel members
were appointed by a president from the same, or different, political party,34 and even whether the gender35 or race36 of a
judge affects the behavior of the rest of the panel. Without
random panel assignment, the “reasoned basis for inference”37—ultimately the ability to make findings on these and
other aspects of judicial behavior—is then called into question.
A recent quantitative study that I coauthored was the first
to formally call this assumption into question.38 The study
examined an original dataset of oral argument panels for all
twelve regional circuits over a five-year span.39 Using a computer program that took into account the number of panels
formed in each circuit in each term and the judges that sat in
each circuit in each term, we were able to simulate the random
configuration of panels.40 Specifically, we ran the simulation
33

See Chilton & Levy, supra note 5, at 2–3.
There have been a substantial number of such papers in the so-called
“panel effects” literature. For prominent examples, see generally Sunstein &
Miles, supra note 2; Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 3.
35
See, e.g., Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 3, at 390 (finding sex-based
panel effects in cases implicating sex discrimination).
36
See Cox & Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, supra note 3, at 29–37
(finding strong race-based panel effects in voting rights cases).
37
See Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17, 18 (2011) (first citing R.A. FISHER,
STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS (1925); and then citing R.A. FISHER,
THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS (1935)).
38
See Chilton & Levy, supra note 5. Ours was not the first to note the
possibility of nonrandom panel assignment, however. For example, a 2009 article
by Matthew Hall noted that in the course of conducting research, he contacted the
clerk’s office of different circuit courts and asked directly whether judicial assignment—the assignment of judges to panels and then panels to cases—was random
in their court. See Matthew Hall, Experimental Justice: Random Judicial Assignment and the Partisan Process of Supreme Court Review, 37 AM. POL. RES. 195,
202–03 (2009). He reports that the clerks of some circuits told him that judicial
assignment was not, in fact, random in their circuit. Id. But to my knowledge,
there are no studies that directly tested whether panels were, in fact, randomly
configured or that sought to understand how panel assignment is made.
39
See Chilton & Levy, supra note 5, at 24.
40
See id. at 31–33. Specifically, we determined how many panels were
formed in each circuit in each year and how many times each judge sat on a
panel. For example, we noted that there were 115 panels during the 2008 term of
the D.C. Circuit and that Judge X had sat on 36 of them. We then wrote code that
randomly configured the panels for that term. The code essentially treated each
time a judge sat as a piece of paper with that judge’s name, put all of the pieces of
paper into a virtual hat, and then randomly picked three names out of the hat for
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100,000 times, generating over one billion panels.41 To determine the likelihood that panel assignment in any given circuit
was random, we compared the distribution of an observable
characteristic—whether a judge was appointed by a Republican president—in the panels as they were formed by the courts
and those that were formed by random configuration.42 Ultimately, our methodology produced findings that suggested
nonrandom panel assignment in several of the courts of appeals.43 Specifically, four out of the twelve regional circuits
had distributions of Republican-appointed judges across
panels that suggested a nonrandom method had been used
when configuring them.44 The study concluded by noting that
further research would be needed to understand how, exactly,
panels were configured.45
In short, there has been a long-standing claim of random
panel assignment in the literature. This claim has proved important for certain types of scholarship, particularly empirical
studies of judicial decision making. Only recently has this assumption been challenged, further underscoring the question:
how are the courts of appeals creating their argument panels?
B. Rules of Randomness
One might think that the answer to how courts form their
panels can be found in the statute books or the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure. As it turns out, these sources have
very few requirements when it comes to panel assignment—
and randomness is not among them. The federal statute governing panel assignment states only that panels must consist
of three judges and that those panels shall sit at the times and
places “as the court directs.”46 The federal rules are silent on
the matter.47
Accordingly, it has fallen to the circuit courts themselves to
decide how to create their panels. They have made their own
determinations about who will assign judges to panels—in
some circuits this task belongs to the chief judge, whereas in
each panel in each term (with the caveat that the same judge could not be selected
more than once for a given panel). Id.
41
Id. at 34–35.
42
See id. at 33–36.
43
See id. at 37–45.
44
Specifically, the D.C., Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits showed statistically significant results. Id. at 38.
45
Id. at 51.
46
28 U.S.C. § 46 (2012) (Assignment of judges; panels; hearings; quorum).
47
See generally FED. R. APP. P.; FED. R. CIV. P.
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others it is the responsibility of the clerk of court or a member
of the circuit executive’s staff.48 And they have made their own
rules about how those panels are to be formed. Although the
circuits do not provide full information about how they set their
panels,49 some information about the processes can be found
in their local rules and operating procedures50 as well as occasionally in reports.51 Additionally, the Federal Judicial Center
has published a monograph on case management that includes
some information on panel formation.52 Taken together, these
sources provide a limited amount of information on the selfimposed rules that the courts follow when deciding which
judges will sit together.
First, the Federal Judicial Center reports in its monograph
on case management procedures that some of the courts use a
random process to configure their oral argument panels. For
example, the Center states that active judges in the Fourth
Circuit “are randomly assigned [to argument panels] by a computer program.”53 The same report writes of the Eleventh Circuit that “[t]o ensure complete objectivity in assigning cases,
the names of the active judges for the sessions of the court are
drawn by lot for the entire court year.”54
Second, a substantial number of courts report that their
judges are assigned to panels in a way that comes close to
randomness but nevertheless does include the deliberate consideration of various factors. Specifically, the Federal Judicial
48

See infra Part II.
It is apparently likewise difficult to find information about the circuits’ case
assignment procedures. See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 48 (2009) (noting that when it comes to how the courts
assign cases to panels, “it appears that no one source effectively aggregates this
information for outsiders”).
50
See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, LOCAL RULES AND
OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, Internal
Operating Procedure 34(a)(1) (2016) [hereinafter 6TH CIR. I.O.P.] (“Judges are later
assigned to panels during the sitting weeks using an automated routine which
searches the court’s database to determine which active judges have the longest
intervals between sitting pairing.”); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT,
LOCAL RULES AND INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT, Internal Operating Procedure 47.1(b)(3) (2016) [hereinafter 2D
CIR. I.O.P.] (“The clerk assigns judges to death penalty case panels by random
drawing from the death penalty case pool.”).
51
For example, a recent Ninth Circuit annual report notes that a particular
panel of all Alaskan judges was formed by the “luck of the draw.” JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT 21 (2014).
52
See LAURAL HOOPER, DEAN MILETICH & ANGELIA LEVY, FED. JUD. CTR., CASE
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (2d ed. 2011).
53
Id. at 99.
54
Id. at 208.
49
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Center reports that the Fifth Circuit relies upon a computer
program to “achieve random assignment of judges to panels,”
but further notes that the program tries to ensure that no two
judges sit together too frequently in a term.55 The Sixth Circuit
similarly states that it begins with a random process—it states
in its Internal Operating Procedures that the court hears cases
in two-week periods during which “[a]t least six active judges
are assigned to one of the two sitting weeks at random” and the
remainder of the active judges are assigned to the other week.56
The court further notes that other factors are then taken into
account when setting the panels: within each sitting week,
judges are assigned to panels “using an automated routine
which searches the court’s database to determine which active
judges have the longest intervals between sitting pairing.”57
The Seventh Circuit also reports that it begins with “random”
assignment of judges to panels “except that the circuit executive uses a computer-generated table to ensure that over a twoyear period a judge sits approximately the same number of
times with every other judge of the court.”58 The Federal Judicial Center reports that the Ninth Circuit likewise begins with a
random assignment process but goes on to consider other factors for the calendar.59 It notes that in the Ninth Circuit, there
is “random assignment of judges by computer to particular
days or weeks on the calendar” which is designed to “equalize
the workload among the judges . . . [and] to enable each active
judge to sit with every other active and senior judge approximately the same number of times over a two-year period[.]”60
Differing from the other courts mentioned here, the Center reports that the panel assignment procedure of the Ninth Circuit
is also meant to “assign active judges an equal number of times
to each of the locations at which the court holds hearings.”61
Finally within this category, the Federal Judicial Center reports
that the Tenth Circuit “randomly” assigns its judges to panels
using a software program, but goes on to note that the program
55

Id. at 115.
6TH CIR. I.O.P. 34(a)(1).
57
Id.
58
HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 52, at 140; see also U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK FOR APPEALS 11 (2017)
(“Assignments of judges to panels are made about a month before the oral argument on a random basis . . . . Each judge is assigned to sit approximately the
same number of times per term with each of his or her colleagues.”).
59
HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 52, at 174.
60
Id.
61
Id.
56
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deliberately “equalizes the number of times judges sit with one
another over a period of one year.”62
There is a final category of courts that state that they configure panels randomly for death penalty cases but do not provide information about panel assignment more generally.
Specifically, the Second Circuit notes in its Internal Operating
Procedures that “[t]he clerk assigns judges to death penalty
case panels by random drawing from the death penalty case
pool.”63 And the Federal Judicial Center states that in the
Third Circuit, “for each death penalty case, a special panel is
constructed, and active judges are randomly assigned to the
panel.”64 There is no additional information about how panels
are formed for the regular argument calendar in these courts.65
Stepping back, there is a striking interplay between the
assumptions about panel assignment, and the rules regarding
that assignment. Although there has been a long-standing assumption in the academic literature that panel configuration in
the federal appellate courts is random, there are no rules—
statutory or otherwise—that require randomness. At most, the
available information suggests that a few courts create their
panels randomly. Far more take into account at least some
factors, thereby making their assignment process nonrandom—a point supported by recent empirical work.66 What
is clear among these conflicting accounts is that there is a
need—for our collective understanding of how the federal
courts operate and for scholarship about the courts—to better
understand how panel assignment is made.
II
PANEL ASSIGNMENT PRACTICES
To learn how the federal courts of appeals create their
panels requires conducting interviews with those closest to the
process: judges and senior members of the clerk’s office from
different circuits. Subpart A first sets out the methodology of
the underlying qualitative study—how the thirty-five federal
appellate judges and senior administrators from five different
circuit courts were identified and interviewed. Subpart B turns
62

Id. at 194.
2D CIR. I.O.P. 47.1(b)(3).
64
HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 52, at 87; see U.S COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, Internal Operating Procedure 16.2 (2017) [hereinafter 3rd Cir. I.O.P.].
65
See generally 2D CIR. I.O.P.; 3D CIR. I.O.P.
66
See Chilton & Levy, supra note 5, at 36–48.
63
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to the findings of the study, detailing the various factors that
many of the courts took into account when creating their
panels. Instead of providing a litany of these considerations,
this subpart creates a typology, organizing factors around their
stated rationales. In so doing, it seeks to both identify, and give
structure to, the motivations behind the different assignment
practices.
A. Methodology
Qualitative methods, and in particular interviewing, have
long been used within law to gain a better understanding of
particular phenomena or practices.67 Gathering data about
court practices often requires interviewing judicial actors, including the judges themselves and court administrators.68
This is particularly important where, as here, the practices in
question are not already fully documented.69 What follows is a
description of the methodology that was employed to both select and interview subjects for this Article.
At the outset, I focused on a subset of the twelve regional
circuit courts in the interest of performing an in-depth review.
To facilitate in-person interviews in particular, and consistent
with past research,70 I selected the D.C., First, Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuits. To be sure, this is not a random sample,
and the circuits share some features that are not common
across the courts—for example, they are all relatively compact
geographically.71 That said, ultimately providing information
on nearly half of the circuit courts serves the study’s purpose,
even if those circuits are not representative of the others.
In selecting interview subjects, I conducted convenience
sampling in some of the most heavily judge-populated areas
within each circuit. That is, I contacted every judge in a given
67
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 289–92 (1991) (describing the use of in-person and telephone interviews); Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 115, 118–20 (1979) (describing the use of in-person and telephone
interviews). For a useful discussion of the benefits of qualitative methods, particularly in-depth interviewing, see Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A
Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 515, 521 n.32, 529–30 (2013).
68
See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 326–27 (2011).
69
As noted already, while some courts and the Federal Judicial Center provide some information on panel formation, that information is not complete. Additionally, not all courts provide information. See supra notes 53–64 and
accompanying text.
70
See Levy, supra note 68, at 327.
71
Id.
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area by email and then met with those who were willing to do
so.72 For the D.C. Circuit, I contacted all active and senior
judges73 in Washington, D.C. as of April 2012.74 Out of thirteen judges in this set,75 I interviewed eight, as well as a senior
member of the clerk’s office. For the First Circuit, I contacted
all of the judges in Boston as of April 2012.76 Of the three
judges in this set,77 I interviewed one, as well as a senior member of the clerk’s office. In the Second Circuit, I contacted all of
the judges in Manhattan, Brooklyn, New Haven, and Hartford
between the spring of 2012 and the summer of 2013. Out of
the twenty judges in this set,78 I interviewed thirteen and a
senior member of the clerk’s office. In the Third Circuit, I contacted all of the judges in Philadelphia between the spring of
2012 and the summer of 2013.79 Out of the four judges in this
set,80 I interviewed three and a senior member of the clerk’s
office. Finally, in the Fourth Circuit, I contacted all of the
judges in Baltimore, Alexandria, Raleigh, and Richmond as of
June 2013. Out of the seven judges in this set,81 I interviewed
five and a senior member of the clerk’s office. Including all
judges and senior administrators contacted, I had a response
rate of roughly sixty-seven percent.
72
I used a standard request letter that I tailored (for example, if I knew the
judge personally).
73
I omitted any inactive judges. In the D.C. Circuit, this meant refraining
from contacting James L. Buckley.
74
The study does not include those judges who were appointed to the court
and sworn in after this time period, including Sri Srinivasan, Patricia Ann Millett,
Nina Pillard, and Robert L. Wilkins.
75
The entire set consisted of Judges Merrick B. Garland, Karen L. Henderson, Judith Ann Wilson Rogers, David S. Tatel, Janice Rogers Brown, Thomas B.
Griffith, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Harry T. Edwards, Laurence H. Silberman, Stephen
F. Williams, Douglas H. Ginsburg, David B. Sentelle, and A. Raymond Randoph.
76
The study does not include David Jeremiah Barron, as he joined the First
Circuit after this time period.
77
The entire set consisted of Judges Sandra Lynch, Michael Boudin, and
Norman H. Stahl.
78
The entire set consisted of Judges Robert Katzmann, Dennis G. Jacobs,
José A. Cabranes, Reena Raggi, Debra Ann Livingston, Gerard E. Lynch, Denny
Chin, Raymond Lohier, Jr., Susan L. Carney, Christopher F. Droney, Jon O.
Newman, Amalya L. Kearse, Ralph K. Winter, Jr., John M. Walker, Jr., Pierre N.
Leval, Guido Calabresi, Chester J. Straub, Robert D. Sack, Barrington Daniels
Parker, Jr., and Joseph M. McLaughlin.
79
The study does not include Cheryl Ann Krause, as she joined the Third
Circuit after this time period.
80
The entire set consisted of Judges Theodore A. McKee, Marjorie O. Rendell,
Anthony J. Scirica, and Dolores Korman Sloviter.
81
The entire set consisted of Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, Diana Gribbon Motz,
Roger Gregory, Allyson Kay Duncan, Andre M. Davis, Barbara Milano Keenan,
and James A. Wynn, Jr.
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Most interviews were conducted in person, although a few
took place by telephone. Some interviews were as short as
fifteen minutes but most lasted between a half hour and one
hour. The interviews were all semi-structured—I asked each
subject a set list of questions about how the panels were configured in his or her circuit, though we also discussed other
topics that arose during the interview.82 To help ensure that
the discussion was as open and candid as possible, I did not
record the interviews and I assured each person I interviewed
that I would not quote him or her by name.83 This is why, as
with previous scholarship, I attribute my findings to “a judge”
or “a senior member of the clerk’s office” within a given circuit.84 To further protect the identities of the judges and senior
court administrators, the findings here generally refrain from
naming specific circuits unless it is necessary for the
discussion.85
B. Findings: Considered Panel Assignment in Five Circuit
Courts
What follows is a compilation of the findings from the interview-based study. These findings both show that the courts
did not employ strictly random panel assignment during this
time period and also detail the various factors they considered
when creating panels (again, to stress a point from the introduction, none of these factors related to the ideology of panel
members). This subpart constructs a typology that organizes
82
For a discussion of semi-structured interviews, see generally MARGARET C.
HARRELL & MELISSA A. BRADLEY, DATA COLLECTION METHODS: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS (2009).
83
Assurances of anonymity are not unusual in interview-based studies about
the federal judiciary. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Mitu Gulati & Ann C. McGinley,
The New Old Legal Realism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 689, 709 n.98 (2011) (providing
information about the subject’s rights of confidentiality and anonymity for a study
that included interviews with federal judges); Mitu Gulati & Richard A. Posner,
The Management of Staff by Federal Court of Appeals Judges, 69 VAND. L. REV.
479, 480 (2016) (“The judges interviewed for this study were promised anonymity
and that no identifying information would be disclosed.”); cf. David E. Pozen, The
Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 520 (2013) (describing the practice of
granting subjects anonymity in studies drawing on interviews with U.S. government insiders).
84
See Levy, supra note 68, at 327. For the present Article, I also use only
male pronouns when referring to judges or senior administrators I interviewed to
further protect their identities. I also omit the location of the interviews for the
same reason.
85
As close readers will notice, attributions nevertheless include circuit designations (i.e., “Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the X
Circuit”) in order to maintain scholarly standards.
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the factors that were considered into categories based on their
stated purpose. Categories include: increasing efficiency, enhancing collegiality, and providing special training for new
judges. This analytic structure provides a framework for understanding the descriptive findings, and further provides a
way to ultimately address the normative questions raised by
panel assignment.86
Before discussing the data, a few caveats are in order.
First, the categories outlined below are not mutually exclusive.
For example, it is entirely possible that a single practice can
both enhance collegiality and also provide special training for
new judges. That said, the subjects typically described the
departures as being related to one purpose. Accordingly, I categorize the practice with the purpose so identified.87
Second, as the preceding paragraph suggests, these categories are based upon how the judges and senior court administrators described the purposes of the practices. For example,
several judges described the practice of ensuring that each
judge sit with every other judge at least some number of times
per term as being motivated by a desire to enhance the court’s
collegiality; accordingly, this particular practice is described
under the heading of collegiality. As with any study that relies
on interviewing, this study is limited by the information provided by the subjects,88 and it is possible that the motivations
were not accurately, or at least fully, described. That said, one
can look to external indications of the subjects’ accuracy with
many of the categories here. For instance, it is difficult to imagine a rationale for encouraging every judge to sit with every
other judge that did not include, at least in part, an appeal to
collegiality.
Third, the findings do not purport to capture all of the
factors that were considered in creating panels. Again, as with
any interview-based project, the data is dependent upon the
responses of the interviewees.89 It is possible that in any given
circuit, there were other factors that went into panel assign86

See infra Part III.
I do, however, note the rare instances in which a practice was identified
with more than one purpose, see infra note 113 and accompanying text, and those
in which a practice was not identified with a purpose, see infra notes 141–51 and
accompanying text.
88
See, e.g., George, Gulati & McGinley, supra note 83, at 709 (noting how, for
a large-scale interview-based project, it was possible that some of the interviewees
had not been “completely candid,” but explaining that the subjects generally
seemed “comfortable and forthcoming”).
89
See id.
87

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN102.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 19

17-NOV-17

FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

13:58

83

ment that were not captured in interviews and thus are not
presented here. The study was designed to mitigate this possibility—by interviewing multiple subjects from each circuit and
asking a range of questions about how panels were formed—
but it is a limitation that bears mentioning.
Finally, it is important to note that the practices listed here
do not necessarily convey how the courts are creating their
calendars today. Practices regarding panel formation, like
court practices generally, may change as the relevant actors
turn over.90 Accordingly, these practices should be understood
as current as of the dates of the interviews, unless otherwise
noted.91
Accommodating Schedules / Managing Logistics
The most common departure from randomness came from
accommodating the scheduling needs and preferences of
judges. In four of the five circuits surveyed here, the courts
took these factors into account when creating oral argument
panels. By and large, these departures were described as
purely logistical.
In one circuit, the deputy chief executive began the process
of creating argument panels by gathering information about
each judge’s upcoming availability.92 He noted when some
judges were planning to travel and other scheduling preferences they had about sitting dates, and then tried to accommodate them.93 The process was similar in another circuit.94
There, information was collected from judges about dates that
90
Indeed, the chief judges of the circuits studied here have all turned over
since the focal period of this study. Specifically, Merrick Garland replaced David
B. Sentelle as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit on February 12, 2013; Jeffrey R. Howard replaced Sandra Lynch as Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on June 16, 2015;
Robert Katzmann replaced Dennis J. Jacobs as Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on September 1, 2013; D. Brooks Smith
replaced Theodore A. McKee as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit on October 1, 2016; and Roger Gregory replaced William
Byrd Traxkler, Jr. as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit on July 8, 2016.
91
There is one practice discussed here that I was told had previously been in
place, but, I was told, was not still in place by the time of the study—a point that I
note. See infra notes 135–40 and accompanying text.
92
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit (June 18, 2012).
93
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
(June 18, 2012); Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, supra note 92.
94
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit (Apr. 20, 2012).
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should be blocked out—for a conference or vacation—and that
information was inputted into a computer program that ultimately created a calendar to be approved by the chief judge.95
In a third circuit, several judges mentioned that beyond accommodating such preferences as wanting to not sit on a particular
date so as to attend a conference, their court might accommodate a judge’s teaching schedule at a law school or even a
judge’s desire to maximize consecutive days in the sitting
city.96 Specifically, one judge noted that some members of the
court taught and therefore wanted to sit more outside of the
semester.97 The same judge went on to note that while some
out-of-town judges requested to have their sittings condensed
to Monday through Friday, others wanted to spend the weekend in the sitting city and so preferred to have sittings that
extended from, say, Thursday to Wednesday of the following
week.98 In short, these courts consistently departed from strict
randomness to accommodate the various scheduling needs
and preferences of the judges, though the extent of the accommodation varied among these circuits.
It may seem inevitable and unavoidable that courts accommodate the scheduling preferences of its judges, but it is important to note that not every circuit did so. In contrast to the
other four circuits, the Fourth Circuit did not factor in availability when creating argument panels.99 The court was able to
do this because of another difference between it and the other
circuits surveyed here—it held designated court weeks. Rather
than have a rolling calendar whereby the court was often in
session, the Fourth Circuit had specific weeks set aside each
year for hearing cases. As such, the judges all knew well in
advance that they were expected to be in Richmond, where
sittings are typically held, during those times.100 The judges
then formed their schedules around these dates, and so no one
mentioned a need to accommodate them.
95

Id.
See Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (Mar. 5, 2012); Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (July 25, 2013).
97
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(Mar. 5, 2012), supra note 96.
98
Id.
99
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit (June 12, 2012).
100
As I discuss at greater length in Part IV, it would be difficult for some of the
other circuits to hold similarly structured court weeks, not least because most of
those circuits hear argument in a higher percentage of cases. See infra subpart
IV.A.
96
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Maximizing Judicial Resources
Several of the circuit courts took particular care to honor
the scheduling preferences of senior judges. The motivating
rationale for this departure was quite different from balancing
pure logistics, however. By accommodating the requests of the
senior judges first, the court was ultimately more likely to maximize the number of days those judges would sit. Because
senior judges decide what kind of workload they will take on,101
failing to accommodate their scheduling preferences might
mean that they decide to sit with the court for fewer days.
Since any time a senior judge is willing to devote to hearing
cases is a net gain for the court in judicial resources,102 the
purpose of the rule was to ensure the greatest number of sitting
days from the senior judges, thereby maximizing judicial resources overall.
Apart from the Fourth Circuit, the courts of appeals were
consistent in accommodating the scheduling preferences of senior judges. Tying back to the previous departure from strict
randomness, I was told that in one circuit, although the deputy
circuit executive tried to accommodate the scheduling preferences of all judges, this was especially true of the preferences of
senior judges.103 A senior member of the clerk’s office in another circuit said that information was collected regarding
when senior judges wanted to sit, and then that information
was factored into the creation of panels.104 A senior member of
a clerk’s office in another circuit stated that senior judges were
allowed to inform the office of when they would like to sit—say,
two times in September.105 A senior judge in that circuit reported being able to request, and indeed insist upon, a certain
101

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
To be sure, if a court needed additional days of service beyond what its
senior judges were willing to provide, it would likely call upon visiting judges to sit
by designation. See Marin K. Levy, Visiting Judges (in progress). From this vantage point, one might say that accommodating the scheduling preferences of the
senior judges ultimately reduces the reliance on visiting judges but does not
necessarily provide a net gain in terms of judicial resources. While this may be
true from a system-wide perspective, from the perspective of each individual
court, accommodating the preferences of senior judges increases their own judicial resources. Moreover, many judges have noted the limitations of using visitors
and have commented that having panels made up only of one’s own court is easier
and more efficient. See id.
103
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, supra note 92.
104
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, supra note 94.
105
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit (Apr. 30, 2012).
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sitting schedule.106 A former chief judge of another circuit said
that in his court, a senior judge might say that she would be
willing to sit for fifteen days and would like eight of them to be
in September and October and so forth.107 In our interview,
the judge acknowledged that this practice made an “inroad”
into randomness.108 Again, the rationale was clear—as one
former chief judge of the same circuit put it, senior judges
would be willing to give more days if they were
accommodated.109
Increasing Efficiency
Related to the general rationale of increasing judicial time,
there was at least one departure from random panels based on
the goal of efficiency. This departure stemmed from selecting
panels to hear cases following a remand.110 The thought was
that if the original panel had put a considerable amount of time
into the case during its first iteration at the court, it would save
judicial time for those same panel members to decide the case
during its second iteration.
Specifically, one judge stated that the panels were all randomly created in his circuit except if cases were coming back
following a remand either to the district court or from the Supreme Court.111 Another judge of the same circuit stated that
if they had to handle a remand, the same panel (meaning the
original panel) would hear it.112 He went on to note that this
was done for efficiency purposes but also mentioned that the
rule is a prudent one in that the parties would not have to
106
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
(Apr. 30, 2012).
107
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(Feb. 29, 2012).
108
Id.
109
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(Mar. 6, 2012). It is worth noting that the gains in judicial resources could extend
beyond additional sitting days. Having one’s specific scheduling preferences
honored would provide the court with one more incentive for eligible judges to
take senior status (thereby “freeing up” another seat on the court sooner rather
than later).
110
The most recent monograph on case management from the Federal Judicial Center also notes this practice in some circuits surveyed here. See HOOPER,
MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 52, at 55, 67.
111
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(June 14, 2013).
112
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(June 14, 2013).
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contend with the equivalent of umpires changing in the middle
of the game.113
Providing Training
Two of the circuit courts reported creating special panels
for judges in their first year or two on the court, with the goal of
providing new judges the experience of presiding. The rationale
was that it was helpful for the junior judge to know what it is
like to be the lead judge of a panel—to manage oral argument,
to assign opinions, and, in some circuits, to file any non-published dispositions.114 The difficulty in ensuring such an experience is that a judge presides only if she is the most senior
member of the active judges on the panel.115 It is therefore
extremely unlikely that a newly appointed judge would be the
senior most active judge on a panel early in her tenure if the
panels were left to chance. Instead, the experience of presiding
could only be guaranteed by putting the new judge on a panel
either with two senior judges or with a senior judge and a judge
from another court sitting by designation.116
In two circuits, there has been a tradition of deliberately
creating just this type of panel, so as to ensure that each new
judge preside within that judge’s early time on the court. A
senior member of the clerk’s office in one circuit stated that the
deputy circuit executive tried to give new judges the experience
of presiding sometime in their first year.117 A judge of this
circuit suggested, however, that the number of judges on the
court was sufficiently small so as to cause new judges to preside early on in any event (meaning that intentional departures
113

Id.
In the Second Circuit, for example, the presiding judge is generally responsible for drafting in the first instance and then filing summary orders—the Circuit’s form of unpublished dispositions. See, e.g., HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra
note 52, at 80 (noting that the presiding judge’s law clerk typically will prepare a
summary order when the judge expects that a given case will be decided without a
published opinion).
115
See 28 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012) (“[C]ircuit judges of the court in regular active
service shall have precedence and preside according to the seniority of their
commissions.”). The only exception to this rule is that the chief judge of the
circuit always presides. See id. (“The chief judge shall have precedence and
preside at any session of the court which he attends.”).
116
As one judge noted, there is an interesting relationship between caseload
and days spent as a presider in his circuit. Because, he said, the caseload had
fallen some in his court, there were fewer judges sitting by designation and, as a
result, he was the presiding judge in fewer cases. See Interview with a Judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, supra note 96.
117
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, supra note 92.
114
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on this account would be rare).118 A former chief judge of another circuit stated that he had created special panels for new
judges to give those judges the experience of presiding.119 A
former chief judge of the same circuit stated that he had done
the same, noting that a little orchestration was required to end
up with a panel that allows a new judge to preside.120
Judges from one of the circuits that had this special practice all commented on how useful it had been for them to preside early in their tenure. One judge said that he thought the
practice overall was a good idea, and specifically that it was
good to have a new judge learn what the burdens are on a
presiding judge, as well as what a presider can and cannot
do.121 Another judge stated that he thought it was important
to break new judges in by giving them some limited opportunity
to preside, sooner rather than later.122 Finally, a third judge
commented that the practice makes one really learn the different techniques and rules of a presider and the role of a presider.123 The judge concluded that having the experience early
on was very helpful, and made him a better judge even when he
was not presiding.124
Enhancing Collegiality
All of the circuit courts surveyed here stated that they
tried—in varying degrees—to take into account the number of
times each judge had sat with every other judge when creating
panels. Some of the circuits had precise rules about “co-sits”—
that every judge must sit with every other judge at least some
number of times, but no more than some other number of
times. Other circuits had no precise rule about co-sits and
simply tried to ensure that the judges were “mixed up” every so
often. The given rationale for attempting to equalize co-sits was
consistent: doing so would enhance the court’s collegiality.
118
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
supra note 93.
119
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 109.
120
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 106.
121
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(Aug. 9, 2013).
122
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 96. This Judge went on to say that the experience of presiding should
not happen too soon, either. Id.
123
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(July 25, 2013).
124
Id.
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Regarding the mechanics of co-sits, one judge stated that
in his circuit, each judge sat with each other judge at least four
times but no more than twelve times during a term.125 He
added that if a judge could not sit during one of his assigned
days and tried to switch with another judge, the chief judge
would not give his approval if the number of co-sittings went
outside the accepted range.126 On the other side of the spectrum, a senior member of the clerk’s office in a different circuit
stated that the deputy circuit executive of his court simply tried
to mix the judges up as much as possible.127
Turning to the rationale behind the practice, one judge
noted that the chief judges in his circuit had always tried to
have everybody sit with everybody else over each term or two—
the theory being that if you sat with someone and knew them
better, you would tend to like them.128 A judge of the same
circuit stated that it was good for judges to work with all of
their colleagues so that they were familiar with them and developed some collegiality.129 A judge of another circuit said that
in his court, no two judges were permitted to sit together more
than twice in the same sitting period so that all the judges got
to know one another.130 A judge of still a different circuit
stated that the computer program used to create panels was
designed to take into account if judges had not sat together for
a long period of time, and further stated that their system was
great for collegiality.131 Finally, a judge of the same circuit
noted that the judges on his court all wanted to know and sit
with each other.132 He stated that he therefore saw the court’s
practice of equalizing co-sits as being consistent with the
court’s general ethos of civility.133

125
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
(Apr. 26, 2012).
126
Id.
127
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, supra note 92.
128
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 121.
129
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 123.
130
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
(Apr. 20, 2012).
131
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(June 12, 2013).
132
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(July 17, 2013).
133
Id.
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Avoiding Acrimony
Related to enhancing collegiality, a few of the judges I interviewed mentioned a pair of rarely-used practices aimed at
avoiding acrimony between members of the court: allowing individual judges to identify other judges with whom they were
unwilling to sit and allowing the chief judge to keep two judges
who were at odds with each other from being on the same panel
for a limited time.134 No judges suggested that either practice
was in use during the time I interviewed them.
In one circuit, I was told of a particular judge who had sat
on the court a few decades prior who preferred not to sit with
certain other members of the court.135 This judge made his
preferences known to the chief judge, who tried to some extent
to accommodate them in creating the argument panels.136 Doing so, it seemed, would avoid acrimony between judges.137 In
another circuit I was informed that this practice had been in
use in the past, depending upon the chief judge. Specifically, I
was told that some chief judges would accommodate a judge
who said he would not sit with another judge, whereas other
chief judges would not.138
The practice of individual judges making panel requests
was contrasted with a slightly different practice, in which a
chief judge would separate two judges who had recently been at
odds. The chief judge would, in effect, give the judges a cooling-off period, and thus would keep them from sitting on the
134
See, e.g., infra notes 135 and 138. It is worth noting that there is some
tension between the theory behind this practice and the preceding one. That is,
all of the courts here thought there was a value in having judges sit together so as
to produce greater collegiality, but here the theory is that sometimes judges need
to be kept apart for the sake of collegiality, or to avoid acrimony. Though one can
see how the two theories can sit side by side—in extreme cases individuals may
well need to be apart to, as the judges said, “cool off” and ultimately come back
together—the tension bears mentioning as it highlights that not all of these various purposes and strategies are totally obvious and, indeed, they may occasionally be at odds with one another.
135
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(Mar. 6, 2012). I learned in conversation that another circuit outside of the five
surveyed here had a similar rule, whereby judges were allowed to note if they had
a particularly bad experience with a colleague during a sitting so that they could
“skip” their next sitting with the offending judge. Telephone conversation with a
Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Jan. 26, 2015).
136
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 135.
137
Id.
138
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, supra note 94.
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same panel for a limited period of time.139 One judge volunteered that he thought this practice was on surer footing than
the previous one, on the grounds that chief judges have a role
in creating a collegial court and avoiding unnecessary
acrimony.140
Considering Unusual Events
A final group of departures was not associated with any
one rationale. Rather, several interview subjects described
how particular panels were created for unusual events as if the
events themselves necessitated the departure from randomness. These events included: first, holding special sessions of
court outside the traditional locales, and second, hosting a
retired Supreme Court Justice.
From time to time, some circuits hold special sessions of
court—either at a district court in a city outside of the designated locations for oral argument or at a law school within the
circuit.141 Of the five circuits surveyed here, all but the D.C.
Circuit reported having held special sittings in the recent
past.142 According to the interviews, the rules of panel configuration and even case assignment143 were different for these
special sessions of court.
As one former chief judge told me, there had been sittings
in numerous locations in his circuit—in New Haven, Connecticut, as well as in Albany and on Long Island, New York.144 The
judge noted that for these sittings, judges who lived in that
geographic area were often selected to be on the panel.145 Although not every circuit that held special sittings followed this
pattern—a senior member of a clerk’s office in one circuit
139
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 107.
140
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 121.
141
See Marin K. Levy, Where Judges Sit (in progress 2018).
142
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, supra note 92; Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, supra note 107; Interview with a Senior Member of
the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, supra note 94;
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, supra
note 132.
143
For example, a senior member of the clerk’s office for the First Circuit
stated that when the court sits in Maine, it tries to hear Maine cases. See Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, supra note 92.
144
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 107.
145
Id.
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stated that judges were not picked specially for these
panels146—this was certainly the practice of several of the circuits surveyed here.
Turning to a different kind of special session of court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor had recently sat by designation with
four of the five circuits surveyed here, and in many circuits the
rules of panel formation were special for this event. For example, in one circuit a judge noted that during a visit from Justice
O’Connor, the Justice ended up on a panel with the chief judge
at that time and a former chief judge.147 The judge I interviewed noted that this was a special panel and suggested that it
was structured deliberately.148 One judge in another circuit
noted that the Justice’s visit is one of the exceptions to the
ostensible rule of random panel assignment.149 He went on to
say that during Justice O’Connor’s more recent visit, she sat
with the court for two days, and on each panel she was joined
by two newly appointed judges to the circuit.150 The judge of
this circuit stated that he did not think this had happened by
chance.151
*****
Beyond providing data on how these circuits created their
argument panels, the study also provides data on how much
the judges seemed to know about these processes. In particular, the findings revealed that at least some judges were not
aware of how panels were formed—either because they said so
directly or because they provided information that turned out
to be inaccurate.
To begin, some judges exhibited a lack of knowledge about
the panel assignment practices of other circuits. Specifically, a
judge from the D.C. Circuit said that he liked the way his court
configured panels and had assumed that every other court put
together their panels in the same way.152 When I told a judge of
the Fourth Circuit that some of the other courts create a spe146
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, supra note 94.
147
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 121.
148
Id.
149
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
supra note 132.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
(July 25, 2013).
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cial panel for new judges to gain the experience of presiding, he
said he was surprised to hear this.153
More striking than the lack of inter-circuit knowledge was
the apparent lack of intra-circuit knowledge among the judges
interviewed here. When I asked judges about panel formation
in the D.C. Circuit, one told me that an algorithm determined
them,154 and another described how a computer program had
been used to create panels in the past.155 At the time I conducted the interviews, the Circuit was not using, nor had ever
used, a computer program to create oral argument panels.156
One Third Circuit judge referred to the computer program that
the court employed to help set panels but noted that he did not
know precisely how the program worked.157 A Fourth Circuit
judge asked me whether his circuit attempted to equalize the
number of co-sittings, as he did not know himself.158 Another
judge of the same circuit likewise said that he did not know
that the court had taken co-sits into account when forming
panels.159
In short, the results of the qualitative study provide an
account of how five of the circuit courts created their argument
panels. In particular, the findings reveal the challenges
presented by creating each court’s calendar and the extent to
which the relevant decision makers were balancing various factors. They further show how these factors were not entirely
appreciated by judicial actors from outside, or sometimes inside, the circuit.
III
ASSESSING PANEL ASSIGNMENT PRACTICES
Contrary to the widespread assumption that panels are
randomly formed in the federal appellate courts,160 the findings
153
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
supra note 132.
154
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
supra note 152.
155
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
supra note 125.
156
Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, supra note 105.
157
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
(Apr. 20, 2012).
158
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(July 31, 2013).
159
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
supra note 111.
160
See supra subpart I.A.
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from the previous Part reveal the myriad factors those courts
consider when deciding which judges will sit together. Normative questions follow from these descriptive findings. Is it problematic that panel assignment is not strictly random? Are
there at least some factors that should not be taken into account when deciding which judges will sit together?
The first question can be dealt with handily enough. Although it might be tempting in theory to argue that courts
should engage in strictly random assignment, such a demand
is impossible to satisfy in practice. As the previous Part shows,
most courts simply cannot perform the functional equivalent of
pulling names out of a hat for each sitting. If a chief judge or
clerk of court is creating a calendar for one year hence, there
will be some limitations—a judge may be scheduled to undergo
surgery during this week, or a judge may have a meeting of a
particular rules committee that week—that, as a practical matter, must be taken into account when creating panels. This
means that at the outset, one must accept that panel assignment cannot be left to chance alone.
The second question is much more complicated to answer.
Outside of those instances in which the courts arguably must
engage in deliberate panel assignment, there is inevitably a
world of trade-offs. For example, taking into account the specific sitting requests of senior judges involves moving further
away from a random configuration of panels but comes with a
gain in judicial resources. How should the courts make sense
of such options?
To even begin to balance the costs and benefits of these
practices requires a thicker account of the values of randomness in the first place. Despite how much scholarship has
assumed that panels are randomly formed as a positive matter,
why randomness is desirable is severely undertheorized as a
normative matter. Accordingly, this Part first identifies the values of randomness in configuring panels by drawing upon arguments for randomness in related adjudicatory contexts. It
then turns back to developing a balancing framework and providing preliminary thoughts on specific court practices, which
could ultimately have purchase on questions regarding other
aspects of judicial administration more generally.161

161
Random selection methods are used, at least in part, in a wide range of
other judicial administration processes, from circuit selection within multidistrict
litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(1) (2012), to case assignment to panels, see
infra note 162.
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A. Values of Randomness
What is the value of having judges randomly selected to sit
together? In few other contexts—legal or non-legal—would one
tout the randomness of a body’s composition as a virtue when
it is selected from a larger group of eligible participants.
Coaches do not randomly choose who will play and who will sit
on the bench in a given game; participants in academic panel
discussions are not determined by lottery. Nor, to turn to other
branches of government, are Congressional committees,
agency leadership, or other governing groups assigned randomly. In all of these contexts, individuals are selected based
on nonrandom characteristics such as their backgrounds and
relative competencies. These observations then push the question to the forefront: why should we value utilizing a random
process for panel assignment?
This is a topic that has been left without a theory: no prior
scholarship has discussed the value of random panel assignment. That said, there has been a little more, from scholars
and the courts themselves, on why randomness is important in
related areas, such as the assignment of cases to judges. It is
useful, as a starting point, to examine those arguments and
ultimately consider their applicability to panel assignment.
It is generally thought that cases are randomly assigned to
judges at the trial level162—and that randomness is important.
Indeed, there have been a few high-profile cases in which the
parties objected to the assigned judge precisely because the
assignment was deliberate. In one prominent example from
the Southern District of New York, a petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that the trial judge in state court
had been assigned to the case because that judge had previ162
See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 519, 523 (2008) (“[W]ell-established rules and norms within the courts of
general jurisdiction require the random assignment of cases to ensure that judges
see all case types.”); Samaha, supra note 49, at 47 (“Lotteries are a key part of the
case assignment procedure in many federal district courts, in the federal courts of
appeals, in many state trial courts and appellate courts, in federal immigration
courts, and elsewhere.”). However, there are some known exceptions. For example, in some districts, a judge may be assigned a case that is “related” to a case
that is already on the judge’s docket. See S.D.N.Y. Rules for the Division of
Business Among District Judges, Rule 13; see generally Katherine A. Macfarlane,
The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern District of New
York’s “Related Cases” Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L.
199, 210–15 (2014) (discussing how the Southern District of New York’s case
assignment rules appear to mandate random assignment but in fact allow for
deliberate assignment methods, including the assignment of related cases to the
same judge).
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ously reviewed the wiretap and search warrant applications.163
The problem, the petitioner argued, was that this earlier assignment had been based purely on which judge the district
attorney had chosen to bring the applications to.164 As such,
the petitioner claimed, the prosecution was essentially permitted to select the judge who would supervise the trial—thereby
resulting in a denial of the petitioner’s due process rights.165
Although the federal district court did not agree that the state
assignment system created a per se constitutional violation,
the court did note that there were significant concerns attendant with such a system.166
Specifically, the district court stated that while all judges
on a given court are vetted by a selection and appointment
process, this does not mean that those judges are interchangeable. Quoting an earlier Supreme Court opinion on the matter
of recusal,167 the district court wrote:
Judges are not fungible; they cover the constitutional spectrum; and a particular judge’s emphasis may make a world of
difference when it comes to rulings on evidence, the temper of
the courtroom, the tolerance for a proffered defense, and the
like. Lawyers recognize this when they talk about “shopping”
for a judge; Senators recognize this when they are asked to
give their “advice and consent” to judicial appointments; laymen recognize this when they appraise the quality and image
of the judiciary in their own community.168

The implicit message from the district court was that having
one judge and not another decide a case could impact the
substantive outcome of that case. The concern, then, with an
assignment process that essentially left the choice of the judge
to a particular party was that the outcome of the case could be
predetermined or biased before it even began. In the words of
the court, “The concept of judge-shopping by a prosecutor for a
163
See Francolino v. Kuhlman, 224 F. Supp. 2d 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
aff’d, 365 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2004). Thanks to Maggie Lemos and Josh Fischman
for pointing me to this case. For a similar example in the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, see State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (La. 1989) (per curiam)
(holding that a process whereby the district attorney was effectively able to select
the judge to preside over criminal cases violated due process).
164
Francolino, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
165
Id.
166
Specifically, the court concluded that while “[p]rosecutorial [j]udge[s]hopping” may give rise to “serious concerns about the appearance of partiality,”
a showing of actual prejudice is required for habeas corpus relief. Id. at 630–38.
167
See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.). Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, in turn, drew upon a dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas in
Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970). Laird, 409 U.S. at 834–35.
168
Francolino, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 630 (quoting Laird, 409 U.S. at 834–35).
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judge whom the prosecutor believes would be inclined or biased in his favor offends our basic notions of justice.”169
Beyond the concern that a nonrandom assignment process
could bias the outcome of the case is the concern that the
process could create an appearance of bias. Here, the District
Court for the Southern District elaborated the specific dangers:
“Any criminal justice system in which the prosecutor alone is
able to select the judge of his choice, even in limited types of
cases, raises serious concerns about the appearance of partiality, irrespective of the motives of the prosecutor in selecting a
given judge.”170 Other courts have similarly weighed in on the
concern of perceived bias when a deliberate case assignment
process is employed at the trial court. Writing for the Seventh
Circuit, Judge Richard Posner has called the practice of allowing a prosecutor to select the judge “certainly unsightly.”171
Although this concern might seem obvious in the case of a
prosecutor essentially being able to pick the judge, other nonrandom processes—for example, having the chief judge assign
cases to judges based on who she thinks should decide them—
would nevertheless raise this same kind of worry. As the Ninth
Circuit has stated, “[t]he suggestion that the case assignment
process is being manipulated for motives other than the efficient administration of justice casts a very long shadow” and
can affect the entire court system.172 And as the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan put it in the famous
case of Grutter v. Bollinger,173 “random assignment of cases . . .
has the obvious, commonsensical and beneficial purpose of
maintaining the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. This purpose is defeated when cases . . . are assigned, or
reassigned, to judges who are handpicked to decide the particular case . . . in question.”174 The court concluded: “A system
of random assignment is purely objective and is not open to the
criticism that business is being assigned to particular judges in
accordance with any particular agenda.”175
169

Francolino, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
Id. at 630.
171
Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 442 (7th Cir. 1995).
172
Cruz v. Abbate, 812 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987).
173
16 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev’d 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002)
(en banc), aff’d 529 U.S. 306 (2003).
174
Id. at 802.
175
Id. Interestingly enough, the potential nonrandomness of case assignment
was again an issue in Grutter at the court of appeals, Grutter v. Bollinger, 247
F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2001), and at the en banc court of the Sixth Circuit, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc). See Tracey E. George & Albert
170
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This consideration of case assignment at the trial court
level reveals two clear reasons for valuing randomness. The
intentional assignment of cases to judges is understood as
deeply problematic for its potential to predetermine case outcomes and certainly for its appearance of predetermining case
outcomes. The value of random case assignment then, at least
largely, is that it ensures that the selection process is not
slanted in a particular way so as to affect the results of cases
and to assure the public that the institution is fair. It is therefore a prophylactic measure; randomness is not valuable in
and of itself, but rather useful as a way to protect the process,
thereby protecting the substantive outcomes of cases and the
perceived legitimacy of the courts.176
It is readily apparent how these values are meaningful in
the related context of assigning cases to oral argument panels
at the courts of appeals.177 The suggestion of deliberately assigning cases to certain panels brings concerns about predetermining the outcome of those cases and harming the perceived
legitimacy of the courts. Indeed, this is presumably why courts
state that the appeals before any given panel have been ran-

H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory and Possible Paradox of
Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2008).
176
The values associated with random case assignment at the trial court level
do not necessarily translate into other contexts, particularly contexts in which a
substantive, rather than procedural, decision is being made. For example, judges
who have flipped coins to make substantive decisions in cases have been reprimanded and even removed from office. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW
491 n.28 (1995) (describing how a New York City judge was removed from office
after admitting that he decided close cases by flipping a coin); see also Samaha,
supra note 49, at 27 n.102 (first citing In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d 301, 302, 307 (La.
1976); and then citing Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n of Va. v. Shull, 651
S.E.2d 648, 650, 652, 658 (Va. 2007)). The concern is not simply that randomness in substantive decision making creates unsound adjudication, but also that
it will cause the public to question legal institutions. See Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 610–11 (1985) (describing how the public
was “incensed” following the case of the judge in New York City who had used coin
flips to decide cases, as the process “offended this society’s commitment to
rationality”).
177
As Professors George and Yoon have written, although there is no constitutional or statutory requirement of random assignment of cases to judges, “most
courts have instituted procedures that result in roughly random assignment of
judges to cases.” George & Yoon, supra note 175, at 32. The authors do, however,
note a few high-profile examples of alleged nonrandom case assignment. See id.
at 2–4, 31.
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domly drawn,178 with little exception.179 The one distinguishing feature between the two contexts concerns the number of
decision makers that will impact a case’s outcome (and thus
the appearance of impropriety). With district courts, the concern about utilizing a nonrandom process for case selection is
that a judge will be selected who is predisposed to be favorable
to a particular side. With appellate courts, as there are three
decision makers instead of one, the concern need not be that
all of the judges hold a certain position but only that a majority
does. Indeed, some of the most high-profile accusations of
nonrandomness have been precisely of this sort.
Just after the Ninth Circuit struck down Nevada’s ban on
same-sex marriage in 2014, the Coalition for the Protection of
Marriage filed a motion for rehearing en banc; part of the Coalition’s argument was that two of the judges on the original panel
were known to be in favor of same-sex marriage and had heard
a disproportionately high number of such appeals.180 Specifically, the Coalition argued that Judges Stephen Reinhardt and
Marsha Berzon—who were “publicly perceived to be favorably
disposed to arguments for expanding the rights of gay men and
lesbians”—had been assigned to many of the same-sex marriage cases, in addition to the one at hand, and it was virtually
impossible that this was the result of chance.181 Accordingly,
the Coalition argued that “[t]he appearance is strong and inescapable that the assignment of this case to this three-judge
panel was not done through a neutral process but rather was
done in order to influence the outcome in favor of the
plaintiffs.”182
178
See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of
Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1041 (2000) (“To create
neutrality, all federal circuits purport to rely on the random assignment of judges
to panels.” (footnote omitted)). The authors go on, however, to call into question
whether neutral assignment of cases to panels is actually taking place in the
appellate courts. Id. at 1069–79.
179
In interviewing judges and court administrators about panel configuration,
the conversation sometimes touched upon case assignment. I was routinely told
that cases are randomly assigned to panels, with the exception that some judges
will be recused from hearing certain cases, and that cases following remand will
often be sent back to at least some of the members of the original panel in some
circuits. For more on this latter topic, see supra subpart II.B.
180
Petition of Appellee Coal. for the Prot. of Marriage for Rehearing En Banc at
4, 11; Latta v. Otter, 779 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-17668), denying rehearing en banc to 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F.
Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012).
181
Id. at 12. Specifically, the Coalition argued that the chances of this happening by random process were, by their calculations, 441-to-1. Id. at 14.
182
Id. at 9.
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This was not the first time that allegedly nonrandom assignment had been used to criticize or delegitimize substantive
outcomes in contested areas of law. In the early 1960s, Judge
Benjamin Cameron of the Fifth Circuit claimed that more than
two-dozen civil rights cases had been assigned to panels with a
“pro-civil rights” majority, all to influence the outcome of the
cases.183 Examining evidence that the cases in the Fifth Circuit were not, in fact, randomly assigned to panels, J. Robert
Brown, Jr. and Allison Lee made a plea for truly “neutral” case
assignment, drawing upon the values noted above.184 A primary justification for this recommendation was “the awareness
that, in the absence of a neutral assignment system, judges will
sometimes gain access to a panel in order to affect the outcome
of a case.”185 The authors also noted that such a system would
“preserve the appearance of judicial impartiality.”186 Accordingly, they concluded that “[j]udges and cases are to be paired
randomly, not deliberately.”187 Again, in the realm of assigning
cases to panels, randomness “matters” not because it is valuable in and of itself, but because it ensures that no process is
employed that would bias the outcome of cases and assures the
public that the process is fair.188
The reasons for favoring randomness in case assignment
appear applicable to panel assignment as well. First and foremost, a primary concern with nonrandom panel configuration
is that the selection of each trio of judges could be done in a
way that ultimately affects case outcomes—most plausibly because it affects the ideological balance of those panels. To see
how this is so, imagine that because of panel assignment practices in a given circuit, that circuit ended up with quite a few
panels with two liberal judges and one conservative judge—and
fewer panels with three liberal judges or one liberal judge and
two conservative judges. To be sure, these practices might not
go on to impact the majority of cases coming before the circuit.
Some ideologically charged cases might come before a panel
183
See Brown & Lee, supra note 178, at 1049–50 (quoting Armstrong v. Bd. of
Educ. of Birmingham, 323 F.2d 333, 352 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J.,
dissenting)).
184
Id. at 1066–69.
185
Id. at 1066.
186
Id. at 1111.
187
Id. at 1069.
188
For another high-profile example of alleged nonrandomness at the court of
appeals, one can look at the en banc decision of Grutter from the Sixth Circuit.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 754–58 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Moore, J.,
concurring); id. at 810–14 (Boggs, J., dissenting). For a helpful discussion of the
claims of nonrandomness in Grutter, see George & Yoon, supra note 175, at 2–4.
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with two liberal judges that otherwise would have come to an
all-liberal panel. And of course, a substantial number of cases
have no clear ideological bent at all or have ideological implications but are “easy” cases that are plainly controlled by precedent or statute, and thus would not be affected by the change
in panel composition. That said, it is still possible, if not likely,
that at least some cases in this scenario would be decided
differently because there were now more “majority” liberal
panels.189 Thus, there is a palpable concern that a nonrandom
process in the panel configuration context could lead to biased
or skewed results of cases.
Second, with respect to concerns about appearances, the
judges interviewed for this Article were quite attuned to the
public’s perception of the judiciary’s legitimacy. One judge
commented that he thought his circuit’s system worked pretty
well—that the public bought into it.190 If the process were
deliberate in some fashion, the judge asked, what would the
public think—that the process had been rigged?191 A judge of
another circuit said that a computer program was used in his
court to help create oral argument panels because the chief
judge wanted to make sure that no one thought he was loading
panels.192
What connects these two major factors in favor of randomness—the prevention of both the reality and the appearance of
inappropriate influence—is the idea that randomness “matters” because it guarantees that no other process was used that
could impact the outcome of cases. In the words of Adam Samaha, a primary justification for randomness as a decision rule
189
As noted earlier, there is a large body of empirical research that suggests
that the ideological composition of three-judge panels has an effect on case outcomes (with ideology being defined by the party of the appointing president). See
generally, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and
Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Over Time, 64 POL. RES. Q. 377 (2011);
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006); Thomas J. Miles
& Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761
(2008); Sunstein & Miles, supra note 2; Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note
3.
Even acknowledging the limits of the so-called panel effects literature, see,
e.g., Edwards & Livermore, supra note 1, it seems uncontroversial to suggest that
over time, having more panels with two liberal judges (and fewer with three or one
liberal judge) will have an impact on some of the cases in a given circuit.
190
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
supra note 112.
191
Id.
192
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
supra note 125.
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is that it is “the least-bad option when behavior might otherwise be socially destructive.”193 Or as Guido Calabresi and
Philip Bobbitt have pointed out, randomness binds the hands
of decision makers to keep them from doing something else.194
The public is aware of this constraining function and thus
randomness becomes a shorthand or proxy for a fair process,
and a fair process in turn assures us that the institutions
rendering decisions are legitimate.
Ultimately, randomness has little to commend itself in a
“positive” way. True, some have suggested a few attendant
benefits of randomness as a decision strategy, such as that it
can be efficient.195 But by and large, randomness is of value
precisely because of what it is not. Utilizing a random process
for creating panels becomes a way to ensure that the cases that
come before those panels have not been biased. Whatever we
may ultimately think of the outcomes in those cases, we can be
satisfied that the results were not preordained and that the
process to arrive at those results, at least with respect to the
selection of the decision makers, was fair. The widespread assumption that panels are randomly drawn and that this is a
good thing is therefore best understood as manifesting a
shared and deeply held belief that legitimacy in judicial decision making results from a dispassionate, “neutral” process.196
Although this conclusion is important in and of itself, it also
suggests that while randomization is a useful starting point or
default for panel assignment, it need not be the only method.
193
See Samaha, supra note 49, at 18. As Professor Samaha elaborates, “A
guarantee of equal probabilities ties the hands of error-prone decision makers
while apparently cutting incentives of potential beneficiaries to curry favor with
them . . . .” Id. at 21.
194
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 44 (1978). Neil Duxbury
makes the same point. See NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND
LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 51–53 (1999). In a not unrelated vein, philosopher Joseph
Raz has noted that in games of “mere chance[,] there is no question of choosing
moves in order to win.” JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 120 (1990).
195
See DUXBURY, supra note 194, at 54. Furthermore, Adam Samaha has
argued that one positive aspect of randomness is that it allows for experimentation. Specifically, because many empirical studies rely on random assignment in
their research design, the utilization of a random process can enable information
collection. See Samaha, supra note 49, at 23–24; cf. Michael Abramowicz, Ian
Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 934–38 (2011)
(describing the importance of randomized controls as part of a larger argument
that governments should use randomized trials to test the efficacy of different
laws and regulations).
196
See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 194, at 13 (noting how “[a] fundamental
feature of decisions reached by lot is that they are stripped of human agency” and
how this feature has been “highlighted as a primary virtue of the lottery decision”);
BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY 74 (1992) (“The impartiality at the heart of
the lottery mechanism is also its major justification.”).
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B. A Balancing Approach
Identifying the values behind random panel assignment is
a necessary first step in evaluating the normative desirability of
any assignment practice. One can now see, at least in general
terms, what trade-offs must be made when assessing departures from randomness. Depending on the particular practice,
the potential benefit—such as a gain in efficiency or collegiality197—should be balanced against the potential for bias and
the appearance of bias.
And yet, determining why randomness is valuable does not
as a matter of course resolve the question of trade-offs. First,
as with assessing any trade-off, one needs a sense of how to
weigh the various values at stake. Does a significant gain in
judicial resources outweigh a slight concern about bias? What
if the gain instead is in providing training for new judges or
enhancing collegiality? Although there may be shared intuitions about at least some of these matters, by and large these
are policy choices about which reasonable minds will disagree.
Second, even if there were a shared sense of the relative
value of the values (so to speak), there is still the problem of
particularities. That is, suppose there was agreement that a
sizable gain in judicial resources could outweigh a slight concern about bias (and the appearance of bias). Presumably a
final assessment would depend on the context. If a circuit had
an enormous caseload—say, 400 or 500 cases per judge—one
might feel differently about the trade-off than if the judges were
not experiencing any caseload pressure. Possible alternatives
would also be part of the context. Suppose a circuit had an
enormous caseload but could easily recruit additional judges to
sit by designation and help ease the burden.198 Any assessment would have to consider the full context of the circuit,
including possible alternative strategies for creating some of
the same benefits (including, of course, the trade-offs associated with those strategies). This is all to say that even making
strides in identifying the reasons why randomness matters in
panel assignment still leaves complicated judgments of value
and fact to be addressed when assessing court practices.
Despite the complexities of these policy choices, there are
still some gains to be made at a general level. It is plain that
there are some court practices that do not, in fact, implicate the
neutrality values of randomness. From a normative perspec197
198

See supra subpart II.B.
See generally Levy, supra note 102.
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tive, those practices are presumptively legitimate. On the other
end of the spectrum, there are some practices that clearly raise
concerns about bias and the appearance of bias. Of those, we
should be particularly wary. This next section addresses each
in turn.
To begin, if a court engages in deliberate panel assignment
but does so in ways that do not raise questions about biasing
the outcome of cases, the costs of such practices can easily be
outweighed by an attendant benefit. Accommodating the
scheduling needs and preferences of judges should be able to
satisfy this standard, at least in most instances. To return to
an earlier example, if a judge is scheduled to undergo surgery
several months hence, it is hard to imagine anyone objecting to
removing her name from the pool of judges when selecting the
panel for that timeframe. Even assuming that she would be
physically capable of serving on a panel at that time, the neutrality value of randomness is not threatened by the accommodation of such personal needs, as presumably they are
distributed relatively randomly among judges. Similarly, if a
judge is planning to visit a law school to judge a moot court or
give a talk to the local bar on a set date, a slight deviation from
randomness is unlikely to bias panels, in fact or in appearance.
All else equal, a practice that attempts to equalize co-sits—
ensuring that every judge sits with every other judge at least
some number of times—likewise seems unobjectionable. This
practice is the functional equivalent of taking a coin and placing it on heads once, then placing it on tails once, and so on,
instead of actually tossing it. That is, the practice uses a nonrandom process to create results that are meant to be consistent with randomness. It is hard to see how this kind of panel
assignment would bias, or be perceived as biasing, the results
of cases. Moreover, it comes with several benefits. As the subjects of the interviews described it, “mixing up” judges leads to
a more collegial court.199 Beyond enhancing collegiality, this
practice can be understood as a prophylactic measure—like
randomness itself—to limit the extent to which panels might
become skewed through other practices. For example, one can
imagine a circuit that accommodates the scheduling preferences of its judges and ultimately ends up with panels that
have a significantly different composition of liberals and conservatives than would have occurred following a strictly random process. If that same circuit now tries to ensure that each
199

See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
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judge sit at least a few times with every other judge, the system
may prevent the skew before it occurs.
These two examples of nonrandom panel assignment practices (common ones, at that) suggest that although balancing
the values at stake in panel assignment practices might sometimes be challenging, some practices involve a substantial benefit and virtually no relevant cost. At the other extreme, there
are some practices that are straightforward to assess because
the costs to the values behind random assignment are so substantial as to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
overcome.
The clearest example of such a practice is a chief judge or
clerk of court forming panels with the intention of achieving
their own preferred case outcomes. To be sure, there was no
evidence that the most troubling version of this practice—panel
“gerrymandering” to bring about more liberal or more conservative case outcomes overall—occurred in any of the circuit
courts. But even if a chief judge only wanted to “moderate” the
law and avoid case outcomes that were particularly liberal or
conservative, the departure would still be deeply troubling.
Such a chief judge would be perhaps neutral with regard to
liberal and conservative outcomes generally, but not neutral
with regard to case outcomes overall—indeed, the departure
from nonrandomness in this scenario is motivated by an assumption about what kinds of outcomes are desirable. As discussed earlier, the legitimacy of the courts and the appearance
of legitimacy both depend on panels not being formed (and not
being seen to be formed) with the intent to bias the results of
the cases before them.200 Again, as one judge said, if the
panels were formed with the intent to affect case outcomes,
what would the public think?201 Accordingly, it is difficult to
see how such a departure from random assignment could ever
be justified.
As the preceding analysis makes clear, certain practices
will be problematic on their face because their purpose—say,
affecting case outcomes—is at odds with the neutrality values
behind randomness. Still, there are other practices that can
threaten these values in less obvious ways. Here, there are two
categories worth noting. The first speaks to the degree of nonrandomness of any resulting panel, and the second speaks to
the effect on the composition of panels overall.
200

See supra subpart III.A.
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
supra note 112.
201
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On the matter of degrees, one can see from Part II that
some departures from random assignment only entail ensuring
that a single judge does not sit on a single, specific day (say,
because of an upcoming meeting or moot court). This is the
functional equivalent of omitting one judge’s name from a hat
and then pulling out three names at random from, say, the
other fifteen judges remaining when creating a given panel.
The incursion on randomness here is slight. Given the neutrality value underlying randomness, it is extremely unlikely that
the resulting panels will be, or appear to be, biased.
Such practices are in direct contrast to those that require
putting a specific judge on a specific panel or drawing a panel
from a very limited number of judges. Examples here include
deliberately selecting the two newest members of the court to
sit on a panel with a retired Supreme Court Justice,202 or
orchestrating a panel with a visiting judge and a senior judge
for a new judge to preside.203 Though not quite as stark, the
practice of drawing judges from a particular geographic region
for a special sitting of court204—especially if this means choosing, say, three names out of a hat when only four names are
put in—falls into this category as well. Although there may be
legitimate values behind all of these practices, the method for
effectuating them is one that results in either a deliberately
selected panel or one that comes close. A panel whose members are handpicked raises significant concerns. As one judge
said, parties are not entitled to a panel that was chosen by
chance, but they are entitled to one that was not chosen deliberately.205 He went on to say that it would be quite dreadful,
and even corruptive, if panels were deliberately formed.206
Again, even though not created for this purpose, such panels
would seem to predetermine case outcomes (simply imagine if
the two newest members of court in the scenario described
above happened to also be the most conservative members of
that court because of the appointing president) and certainly
could have that appearance. As such, even if infrequent, these
sorts of panel assignment practices carry a burden of
justification.
Finally, just as it is important to consider the purpose and
degree of any given departure from random panel assignment,
202

See supra notes
See supra notes
204
See supra notes
205
Interview with a
(Mar. 5, 2012).
206
Id.
203

148–51 and accompanying text.
114–24 and accompanying text.
141–46 and accompanying text.
Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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courts should also consider its effect on panel composition
overall. As noted earlier, it is possible that a court’s practice of
taking into account otherwise unobjectionable factors when
creating panels—say, the scheduling requests of its judges—
could lead to unintended, and indeed problematic, consequences. Imagine a circuit in which quite a few conservative
judges requested to take vacation in June, as they were timing
their leave around a Federalist Society Conference. And imagine, too, that many of the liberal judges on the court requested
to be gone in July, as this time coincided with an American
Constitution Society event. As a result, there would now be a
considerably higher number of all or at least majority liberal
panels (from June) and all or at least majority conservative
panels (from July) than would otherwise sit. Although this
hypothetical might seem far-fetched, my co-author and I found
these kinds of distributions in some of the circuit courts in our
quantitative assessment of panel assignment.207
As the vast literature on panel effects suggests, this shift in
the ideological balance of panels would likely impact case outcomes.208 Moreover, if litigants began to notice that there were
a significant number of all-liberal panels one month and a
significant number of all-conservative panels the next, they
might raise concerns—not unlike those raised by the litigants
in the Ninth Circuit appeal involving the ban on same-sex marriage.209 Accordingly, concerns about the values associated
with randomness could arise no matter the purity of the motivation for the departure or the slightness of the degree of the
departure.
How would a court know if the effects of a given practice
had raised this issue? Determining the relevant threshold is no
easy task. One possibility is to follow the lead of the quantitative work and compare a set of randomly distributed panels to
those actually created.210 If there were a statistically significant ideological shift of the panels, then the courts would do
well to reexamine their practices.
In sum, there are trade-offs with all of the practices identified here. The challenge is to determine a framework within
which to make assessments about those practices. This Part
has set out a balancing framework and identified the values at
stake in random panel assignment. In particular, concerns
207
208
209
210

See
See
See
See

Chilton & Levy, supra note 5, at 32–37.
supra note 189.
supra notes 180–82.
Chilton & Levy, supra note 5, at 27–31.
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about bias and the perception of bias seem to drive an interest
in randomness—in this context and others in judicial administration. With these values in mind, one can examine panel
assignment practices and make some headway in assessing
their normative desirability. Specifically, some practices—
such as accommodating the scheduling preferences of judges—
will be unobjectionable in many instances. Other practices,
however, such as selecting judges for certain panels, may raise
concerns. Still others will fall somewhere in the middle and are
the sort about which reasonable minds may well disagree. The
final question is whether there are any overarching guidelines
or best practices that courts may want to consider applying to
the panel formation process.
IV
PRESCRIPTIVE MEASURES FOR COURTS
Just as descriptive findings lead to normative questions,
normative conclusions lead to prescriptive questions. In light
of the assessments of different court measures in Part III, are
there any broader process-based rules that courts should consider going forward?
This question dovetails with another that is raised by the
particular findings of this study. One of the most notable discoveries is that no two courts created their panels in precisely
the same way. Although there was some overlap in the factors
they considered, each court had a unique way overall of deciding which judges would sit together. As with other aspects of
judicial administration,211 one may well wonder if one approach is preferable to another, and ultimately if there should
be greater uniformity among the federal courts of appeals.
A single way to address the concerns underlying both
points would be to propose a set of best practices for the courts.
Drawing on the discussion of Parts II and III, one could imagine
calling for courts to follow a particular circuit’s way of configuring panels or, more generally, for the consideration of certain
factors over others when constructing calendars.
And yet, the main problem with a one-size-fits-all approach
for the circuit courts is that the courts are dramatically different sizes in the relevant senses. They have different needs and
features, making the replication of one circuit’s process or the
scaling up of any one individual panel assignment practice
211
See Levy, supra note 68, at 377–83 (discussing the lack of uniformity
among the case management practices of the federal courts of appeals).
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potentially impracticable. Moreover, as the analysis of Part III
makes clear, assessments of any given departure from randomness will turn on the particularities of the courts—given that
those particularities differ greatly, so too must the assessments
of the practices. In short, it is difficult to see how there could
even be a set of best practices that could apply to all of the
circuits; there will inevitably be some disuniformity across
court practices.
Determining that there are no substantive guidelines for all
courts to follow does not close the door on prescriptive measures, however. There is still one process-based guideline that
could prove useful. In light of how little previously was known
about panel assignment—by the public, by scholars, and even
by judges—this Part concludes by calling for greater transparency of such practices in the future.
A. Accepting Disuniformity
Given the normative questions surrounding some of the
panel assignment practices uncovered by the qualitative study,
it would be tempting to consider measures that should guide
the panel assignment process. Doing so would also help to
limit the variation in practices across circuits. Drawing upon
past research in judicial administration,212 however, this subpart shows that this type of guide would quickly prove
unworkable.
One particularly useful illustration in this regard is the
“court week” model of the Fourth Circuit, discussed in Part
II.213 Rather than having rolling sittings throughout the year,
the Fourth Circuit had six designated sitting weeks during
which all judges were expected to come to Richmond to hear
cases.214 Because the Fourth Circuit had these six weeks set
aside each term, it bypassed some of the logistical problems
that other circuits faced (for example, the judges all knew in
advance not to schedule a vacation or agree to judge a moot
court during this time). More broadly, employing a court week
model meant that the Fourth Circuit could configure its panels
212

See generally id.
See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
214
See Interview with a Senior Member of the Clerk’s Office, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, supra note 99; see also U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, APPELLATE PROCEDURE GUIDE, DECEMBER 2016, https://
www.ca4.uscourts.gov/AppellateProcedureGuide/Calendaring___Argument/
APG-oralargument.html [https://perma.cc/9H9T-ZCX6] (“The court sits in Richmond, Virginia from Tuesday-Friday during six separate ‘court weeks’ scheduled
between September and June.”).
213
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using a process that came closest to random assignment, as
the court’s members were generally present at the same
time.215 Given these apparent benefits, it would be tempting to
argue that all circuits should follow the court week model when
creating their calendars.
Unfortunately, such an argument quickly runs aground
given the significant differences between the circuits. To begin,
the courts receive dramatically different quantities of filings per
year. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
in 2016 there were 1,156 cases commenced in the D.C. Circuit,
as compared to 4,460—nearly four times as many—in the Second Circuit.216 The number of judgeships allocated to each
circuit is meant to loosely track the workload, but the number
of cases per judgeship still varies considerably. During this
same time period, there were approximately 105 cases per
judgeship in the D.C. Circuit and 343 in the Second Circuit.217
In addition to the number of cases, circuits also vary significantly when it comes to the type of cases they receive. The D.C.
Circuit famously receives a sizeable number of complex agency
cases as compared to the other circuits, which can have oral
arguments that last for two hours; the Second Circuit has had
a high number of immigration appeals in recent years, few of
which receive oral argument.218 The fact that the dockets differ
so much from circuit to circuit ultimately has an effect on how
many oral arguments the court will hear each year, and therefore on the composition of panels.
A less well understood, but still important, factor in determining how many cases go to argument is the pre-existing
norm around oral argument in each circuit. As I have written
about elsewhere, judges and court administrators have expressed that their court has a particular tradition when it
comes to oral argument.219 Specifically, judges of the Second
215
A court week model still cannot solve the problem of a judge unexpectedly
falling ill or other similar events occurring that make strictly random assignment
impossible.
216
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE B: U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—
CASES COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING
DECEMBER 31, 2015 AND 2016, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/stfj_b_1231.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV2E-VQQM]. If one looks
outside of the five circuits surveyed here, the difference in caseload is even more
dramatic. The Ninth Circuit, for example, had 11,291 cases commenced during
this same time period. Id.
217
To arrive at these figures, I took the number of appeals commenced in each
circuit and divided it by the number of judges in that circuit. For a list of the
number of judges per circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2012).
218
See Levy, supra note 68, at 356, 366–68.
219
See id. at 368–73.
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Circuit have reported that the court has long valued holding
oral argument whenever possible.220 By contrast, a judge and
court administrator of the Fourth Circuit reported holding oral
argument less frequently, out of a desire to spare parties the
expense of traveling to Richmond if it seemed highly unlikely
that a hearing would affect the outcome of the case.221
All of these factors—size of the docket, composition of the
docket, and norms surrounding oral argument—affect how
many cases go to oral argument in each court. If one looks to
cases terminated on the merits after argument in 2016, there
were 257 or approximately 23 per judgeship that occurred in
the D.C. Circuit, 792 or approximately 61 per judgeship in the
Second Circuit, and 300 or 20 per judgeship that occurred in
the Fourth Circuit.222 And if one focuses on administrative
agency appeals, which can have particularly long arguments,
there were 90 that went to oral argument in the D.C. Circuit, 31
in the Second Circuit, and 26 in the Fourth Circuit. Now, these
numbers do not fully convey how many weeks of oral argument
each judge sat, as circuits have senior judges who hear cases
and some import judges to sit by designation to hear cases as
well.223 But they do help show that although the Fourth Circuit may be able to have six weeks of court each year, other
circuits may need to have many more—because they have significantly more cases and/or because they have a higher percentage of cases that demand long arguments. And while it
may be possible to have judges set aside six set weeks out of
the year during which time they do not make any other commitments, this practice becomes far more challenging to put in
place if judges have to agree to do the same with one or two
weeks out of every month (particularly when those sittings take
them far from home). This is all to say that while the court
week model might seem, at first blush, like a model that other
courts should be encouraged to adopt, not all circuits would be
able to do so in light of their docket demands and pre-existing
norms around oral argument.

220

Id. at 369.
Id. at 369–70.
222
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE B-1: U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—
CASES COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING, BY CIRCUIT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2016, http://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_b1_1231.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FB6Q-QGXU]. To calculate cases per judgeship, see supra note 217.
223
For more on the extent to which the different circuits rely on visiting
judges, see generally Levy, supra note 102.
221
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Given the difficulties of imposing any one court’s process
on another, one could imagine proposing a “next best” step—
encouraging the consideration of certain factors over others
when configuring panels. Returning to the findings of Parts II
and III, one clear candidate would be the consideration of how
many times each judge had previously sat with every other
member of court. Taking this factor into account not only
seems unobjectionable given the values behind random panel
assignment, but also comes with significant benefits, including
the ability to prevent (or at least mitigate) ideological skews
across panels.224 While all of the circuits surveyed here took
past co-sits into account to some extent when creating panels,
for some this meant only ensuring that the judges were “mixed
up” every so often.225 In theory a useful guideline would take
the current approach one step further and encourage all courts
to equalize co-sittings; this essentially amounts to asking
courts to deliberately place a coin on “heads” and then “tails”
repeatedly, since true coin-flipping is not possible under the
circumstances.
Although promising at first glance, perfect equalization or
even near perfect equalization is ultimately bound to run into
the same difficulties that replicating the court week model
faces based on the differences among circuits. Ensuring that
judges sit together roughly an equal number of times is feasible
if it is simple enough to bring judges together in the first place.
During court week, for example, it is easy to constantly mix
judges because all of the judges are in the same place at the
same time. Accordingly, if most judges have sat together several times in a given term but Judges A and B have only sat
together once, it is easy enough to put that pair together when
creating the next panel.
The ability to bring everyone together an equal number of
times becomes constrained in circuits in which the judges are
coming together from numerous cities across different states.
Once judges are traveling a fair distance to hear oral argument,
courts generally have those judges sit for several days in a
row226 and then provide them some time—at least a few

224

See supra subpart III.B.
See supra notes 125–33 and accompanying text.
226
As one judge said, if a judge is coming from Vermont to New York, you want
to make it worth his while, and so geography becomes a factor. Interview with a
Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (July 25, 2013), supra
note 96.
225
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weeks—before the next sitting.227 As a logistical matter, then,
it simply becomes more challenging to bring everyone together;
the costs become too great. In speaking to one judge from the
Second Circuit about the possibility of equalizing co-sits, I was
told that in theory the goal was a good one but probably not
feasible given the realities of the court.228
In short, following on the normative discussion of panel
assignment practices, it may be tempting to call for courts to
adhere to certain prescriptive measures. In particular, one
could imagine suggesting that the circuits adopt a court week
approach to panel formation or, at least, suggesting that they
equalize co-sittings so as to guard against unintended consequences of nonrandom assignment. Such proposals quickly
prove unworkable in practice, however, in view of the considerable differences across circuits. Accordingly, some disuniformity across the courts is inevitable and must be
accepted.
And yet, concluding that a best practices approach to
panel formation will ultimately run aground does not mean
that there are no prescriptive measures worth adopting. Specifically, this last subpart considers one process-based guideline: increasing the transparency of panel assignment
practices.
B. Increasing Transparency
This Article began by documenting an assumption and a
lack of public information about panel assignment.229 Up until
this point, the dominant view in the literature has been that
panels are randomly formed in the circuit courts. No doubt
part of the reason for this mistaken claim is that there is little
information to be found on this topic. Indeed, the only way to
acquire a fuller account of the courts’ processes for creating
panels was to conduct a multiyear in-depth interview study. It
should be emphasized that this project was only possible be227
As a former chief judge said, if judges like to sit four or five days in a row, as
some judges do, then you are going to give them three weeks off before their next
sitting. Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
supra note 107.
228
Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(July 25, 2013), supra note 96. Another judge of the same circuit likewise said he
thought trying to equalize judges was expressly a good policy but quite difficult for
the chief judge to effectuate given the different times that judges want to sit and
given that the court is constantly in session. See Interview with a Judge of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, supra note 121.
229
See supra subpart I.A.
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cause of the open and candid responses of numerous judges
and senior court administrators. But for the benefit of the
judiciary as a whole, scholars, and the public more generally,
the courts should provide greater information on how they form
their panels in their local rules or through the Federal Judicial
Center.
First and foremost, this information is critical for the court
administrators and the appellate judges themselves. As noted
earlier, one of the most surprising findings of this study was
the extent to which the judges were unaware that their own
practices varied from those of other courts and were even unaware of what their own practices were.230
On the matter of inter-circuit knowledge, providing more
information in the local rules or through the Federal Judicial
Center would inform judges of practices that they would not
otherwise be aware of—such as the practice in some courts of
creating special panels for new judges to preside.231 (Indeed,
when I informed one judge of this practice during our interview,
he responded that he was “surprised” to hear of such a
thing.232) This, in turn, would allow courts to decide if there
were any practices that they should adopt for their own court.
Conversely, judges might learn that a particular practice employed in their court was an outlier, and this might lead them
to reconsider it. To be clear, given the differences among the
circuits, the hope would not be to generate a list of best practices for every circuit to follow. Rather, the goal would be to
enable the courts to learn about new, and reexamine old, policies to carry out important deliberations about panel practices.
On the matter of intra-circuit knowledge, several judges in
this study demonstrated a lack of awareness of the panel configuration process in their own court—either by saying so directly or by providing information that turned out to be
inaccurate.233 The lack of knowledge on the part of judges
about their own circuit practices is surprising and also far from
ideal. Given that the choices surrounding panel assignment
are policy choices, it is important for all of the members of the
court to be informed of the tradeoffs and to be able to weigh in
on, and even object to, certain decisions.
Second, greater transparency of panel assignment practices is important for the public. As litigants, as potential liti230
231
232
233

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra

notes 152–59 and accompanying text.
notes 114–24 and accompanying text.
note 153 and accompanying text.
notes 154–59 and accompanying text.
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gants, and as citizens affected by decisions, we are entitled to
know how the courts form the panels that decide thousands of
appeals per year. Moreover, as noted above, it is critical to have
a check on the process given all that is at stake in these administrative practices. The judges themselves can serve as one
important check; the public should serve as the other.
The final consideration in calling for greater transparency
concerns a particular subset of the public: scholars. As this
Article has detailed, numerous empirical studies have assumed
that panels are randomly configured.234 The fact that they
ultimately are not may affect the findings of those studies.235
The implications are significant. If scholars do not have complete information about how courts function, their ability to
study those courts and measure various factors—such as the
impact of a judge’s ideology or race or sex on panel outcomes—
will be seriously undermined. Returning to the notion of
checks, scholars play a critical role in informing the courts and
the public about the effects of given court practices. It is important that they, in turn, have the necessary information to
carry out their work. Studies such as the one underlying this
Article can make significant gains, but they are no substitute
for greater information flowing directly from the courts
themselves.
In short, the panel configuration process is a near-endlessly complicated one. It requires juggling different interests
and balancing different values. And courts are simply, and
fundamentally, too different for one model or even practice to
necessarily be followed by all. But again, this conclusion does
not mean there is no room for change. In fact, panel assignment practices would benefit substantially from greater sunshine measures. This Article has done much to provide an
account of how the courts create their panels with the help of
members of the judiciary. But more information should be
made available—for the public, for scholars, and for the courts
themselves.
CONCLUSION
Any litigant will tell you that the composition of a panel
matters for the outcome of an appeal. And any scholar of judicial decision making will tell them that they are right. How
234

See supra note 3; see also supra subpart I.A.
See Chilton & Levy, supra note 5, at 50–51 (discussing how a finding of
nonrandom panel assignment affects researchers who use empirical methods to
study judicial behavior).
235
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appellate courts decide to configure their three-judge panels
can have wide-ranging consequences. This is true for case outcomes, but also for legal doctrines more generally, and for
scholarship about the judiciary.
This Article has questioned the traditional story of panel
assignment and undertaken significant work to provide an account of how the courts of appeals in fact assign judges to
panels. In so doing, it has detailed the various factors that
courts consider when setting their calendar, moving away,
sometimes necessarily, from strictly random panel assignment.
Beyond challenging the positive story, this Article has also
challenged the normative story—that panels should be randomly drawn. It has clarified both the costs and benefits of
randomness, arguing that there can be valid reasons to depart
from it. And as such, it has provided a framework for addressing different assignment practices and other matters of judicial
administration.
Ultimately, it falls—and indeed must fall—to the courts to
decide how to configure their panels. And it falls to scholars,
and to the public, to understand, evaluate, and suggest improvements to the inner workings of the federal court system.

